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Transcribed Speech of Troyen Brennan
DR. BRENNAN: [A]lthough I teach health law at the Harvard Law
School, I am not really a health law expert, I would not say. I am really a
practicing internist and I run a small medical group at our hospital, the
Brigham and Women's Hospital. I am interested in health policy and did
some teaching in health policy, so my presentation will be a relatively broad
look at things.
First, I will go over the major problems in health care policy today. You
are going to see that I think the major issues are around cost. [T]hen what I
would like to do is sort of just travel very briefly through a number of areas
where there is a reasonable amount of litigation, looking at sort of the
litigation side of health law, to find out whether or not the health law, as we
understand it, can really help us in these issues. I will leave regulation per
se off to the side and instead look at the way in which courts address things.
[This is] the outline: key issues in health policy; a look at some of the
primary impetus in health care law; and then try to answer the question
about whether it really helps bring about rational reform.
I have already said that I am not an expert in these areas and my
conclusions may be very different than yours and hopefully those things
will come out in the discussion.
[W]henever I talk to law students and public health and medical students
about health care policy, you can trace everything through three issues:
cost, quality, and access. There is really nothing else. I'm going to say cost
is the overriding issue in quality. There is always a lot of talk about quality.
[T]he problem is that cost is directly related to access. So, the train wreck
is higher cost, much less access. Nothing in health policy or health law
really addresses those issues.
[L]ooking at the GDP and healthcare spending, what we see is [that]
health care spending, which is the spending by median income, tracks along
with lack of insurance. The more money we put into health care, the more
people we leave behind, and that is the major issue for us. So, cost and
access are going to be very closely related. The more resources you've got
in the system the more people we leave on the sidelines. Most of the
uninsured increase comes from premium growth. We can draw that out
from a policy point of view. So, I will take that as a given in the rest of the
talk.
[T]hese are the facts that I've seen: [The] population is aging and that is
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going to drive cost. The working population is shrinking. There is not
enough money. Doctors and hospitals are going to continue to import
technology because we make money on that and my business plan for my
$400 million medical group is all about import of technology. [A]ll of that
is going to negatively impact quality and access. So, cost, quality, and
access are really going to be tied up together.
[D]emographics are the best way to sort of look at things when you are
trying to be a futurist. The demographics here are disturbing. The
population is aging and the number of people who are supporting the
elderly shrinks dramatically over the course of the next 15 years. John had
a nice slide about the number of hospital beds in the United States.
Chicago, for example, [is] way under-bedded for the amount of care that's
going to need to be provided as the population ages.
[T]he next slide just shows what the projections are in the Medicare
spending.' Just suffice it to say that this would be the numbers as the
budget office put them together in 2000. They are already out of date. The
blue part was supposed to be what the additional spending was going to be
on the Modernization Act for prescription drugs. That has now tripled. So
this whole thing [is] unsustainable. Everybody in the federal government is
looking at it right now - unsustainable increases in Medicare. So every
state, I imagine Illinois, is looking at ways to cut its Medicaid budget and
we are going to see what you do about those things.
The next slide shows changes in health insurance premiums.2 This is
from Hewitt. [T]he most interesting thing is the percentage of the average
family's income [going toward] health insurance. [B]y 2010, it will be
about thirty-five percent, which is an enormous number. So how do we do
cost control? I was trying to break the health care system down in terms of
cost, quality, [and] access. What do you do about cost? What we do about
cost basically boils down to these four things and really not much more:
you can manage care, you can restrict technology, you can underinsure, or
you can do pay for performance. Managed care is doctor-based rationing;
restricting technology is system-based rationing, underinsurance is patientbased rationing; and pay for performance is really sort of a watered-down
form of doctor-based rationing.
I am going to argue that we are moving in this direction and if I had time
to argue the ethics and the laws of policy, I would say that is the exact
wrong way to go because the patients are poorly situated in order to ration
their care. In fact, most ration received is due to underinsurance; but, alas,
that is where we are headed. Managed care did work. Managed care is just
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bringing market incentives to the doctor-patient relationship and there was a
tremendous backlash against it. Here, law really did play a role - a
relatively negative role, from my point of view - in terms of eliminating
managed care, but it appears to have worked in terms of cost in the mid1990s.
So, these are the changes in health plans. [When] I started practicing
medicine in 1987, almost everything was in conventional insurance. I have
a bottom line to meet a budget. I \\ish I was a health care executive back in
1988 because howx could you not make money there? It was all cost-based
reimbursement. You can see that is gone. [T]he PPOs have completely
overwhelmed any real management of care. [T]hose are fairly striking
shifts in the way in which we are paid. It is a completely different situation
today than it was fifteen years ago.
This [slide shows] the decrease in health care spending we saw in the
heyday of managed care, just after the "Hillary Clinton plans" came
through.3 But you can see it has bounced back up. [It] is much higher than
regular background inflation and there is really nothing that is controlling
that right now. [Therefore,] health care costs are really out of control at this
point because managed care has pretty much gone away. The backlash
against the managed care industry was very intense.
[O]ne of the reasons why managed care failed is because all care became
managed. So, managed care is gone. It looks like it worked, but right now
there is very limited managed care going on except for small pockets in
California and elsewhere where the funds flow dictates that they manage
care.
[T]he second approach is to restrict technology. This is very difficult in
the United States. [T]he reason why most of my colleagues travel to
Chicago around this time of year is to go to the RSNA [Radiological
Society of North America] which meets, I think, in December down at the
big convention center on the South Side. Those are the radiology meetings.
If you want to understand sort of inflation and health care, what you need to
do is go to that meeting and see the kind of stuff that you can buy. I am
definitely buying 128 or 256 scanners in the next couple of weeks to be able
to put down in sites out in the metropolitan area in Boston because I am
going to make a lot of money off of them over the course of the next five to
eight years.
We have a very difficult time restricting technology and I would say it is
very interesting to see how much money is being spent. I would say, in
general, health care is very lightly regulated. [I]n general the laws are
pretty weak. This [slide] is something that is put together by the certificate
3.
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of need regulators and it shows the states that have significant certificate of
need regulation.4 [Y]ou can see that some are in the south and some are in
the northeast; but, in general, the important thing about this matrix is that
almost every state has enormously diluted its certificate of need oversight. I
x'ould say there is probably only two or three states that do anything
significant. Almost everybody has moved over to let the market rule rather
than having strong determination of need. I know there has been some
litigation around those issues in Illinois and I would not be able to address
how difficult you all think it is to put new technology in hospitals or
shopping centers in Illinois. But, in general, I would say it is not that
difficult and, if anything, this is receding.
[What is] the reason why we are interested in this? [T]he whole point
here is that there is a great deal of provider-induced demand and that
provider-induced demand is generally driven by our access to technology.
[W]here there are more specialists or there are more hospitals, there is more
competition, and there tends to be higher costs. That is what we will
continue to see. [R]ationing through doctors is not going to work because
managed care has, sort of, gone away. Rationing through the health care
system the way that Canada does, where it creates few in order to reduce
health care cost, is not going to work because we will not restrict access to
technology.
[T]he next step is really to do patient-based rationing; underinsure people
and let them decide what health care to use. I may be buying scanners, but
[the patients] may have an insurance plan that does not pay for the entire
cost of those scanners, so they will have to pay out of pocket. Maybe they
will start rationing themselves. It is okay for the insurance companies
because they have a hard time seeing how they are going get sued when a
consumer has made the choice that they want that kind of health plan, but it
presumes that the patient consumer has real choice. [T]his is the ancient
issue in health policy: whether or not health care can be created by [an idea
similar to], "I'm going to purchase a TV" or "I'm going to get some health
care;" whether [health care] is like a real consumer good; or whether there
is something that [says] when you are sick, you actually do not think like a
consumer. [Y]ou think like a patient. [T]hat is the sort of important
fundamental issue underneath patient-based rationing.
[I]t is an easy choice. It is an easy choice for doctors because we do not
have to get involved in trying to assess whether or not care is cost effective.
It is easy for the insurance companies; it is easy for the employers, so it is
an easy choice. We are making a series of easy choices that are nice,
lubricating us along to a significant train wreck of a health care system.
4.
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[T]his is what the employers are interested in. They do not want to reduce
choice because they do not want to put defined contribution plans in place
because they are fearful that their employees do not like that; but they are
quite willing to put in cost sharing for medical care and for pharmaceuticals
and for medical treatment. So what is happening is, instead of people being
fully insured, what we're doing is sort of carving out their insurance with
larger copays and larger deductibles; an even more radical approach.
[T]he next slide from the University Hospital Consortium, which is
usually a very mild-mannered organization, is actually taken directly from
the slide show at their most recent meeting suggesting that these
consumers' health plans are really a smoke screen. There are no real
quality measures, or if there are, they are too complex for the average
consumer. The risk for inflation is shifting to the consumer.
[T]he next slide [illustrates] a plan that is available in Florida. [I]t looks
like there is a $100 deductible, eighty percent of services are covered in
excess of the deductible, and your maximum out of pocket for covered
services is S2000. So, that's a cheap plan that you can buy. However, if
you look at the finer details, the covered services, only $600 per day or
S 1200 per day in the ICU. For my ICU, if you go to the thirteenth floor of
the Brigham and Women's Hospital and you go into our new ICU there,
you're in for $3200 that day in terms of our costs. [S]o, this [plan] is not
going to cover those costs. [This plan] is going to get the insurance
company out of it; it is going to get the policy people out of it; it is going to
have me as the provider and the patient in it, though, because what I am
going to [do] is to try to collect when these limits hit against these
individuals. [As part of] a non-profit organization, how hard am I going to
be able to go after people in order to pay for these costs? [B]ehind all that
is [the idea] that perhaps this will begin to limit our interest, our provider
interest, in providing ever more intense care. [T]his is the type of
underinsurance that we are going to see is going to lead to patient rationing
and, I think a lot of people can look on the other side of that, some provider
rationing.
The reason why it does not work is because, although personal income
continues to go up over this period of time, that is, from 1980 to the year
2004, savings are way down. People do not have sufficient savings to
really be undertaking these kinds of plans when they get really sick, so what
we are going to do is basically bankrupt people and, from a provider point
of view, not be able to collect against them.
There is a lot more cherry picking and there will continue to be cherry
picking because doctors and hospitals are sort of rational, financial players.
5.
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There will be some regulations, but they'll look for the well insured people
and try to stay away from the poor or uninsured people. That will lead to
quality problems, especially for the poorly insured individuals.
In regard to consumer-driven health plans, people think these consumerdriven health plans are poised for growth and this is what Forrester, at least,
is predicting: maybe about a twenty-five percent share for these kinds of
consumer-driven health plans where you've got huge deductibles and copays and a lot of uncovered services. They hope that by providing these
kinds of relatively low cost plans, they will get these small firms. However,
you can see they are continuing to lose the small firms and will continue to
sort of do so unless there is a pricing mechanism that offers them a low cost
plan. But, as I said, that low cost plan is going to be basically an uninsured
plan.
That brings us, finally, to pay for performance. It is characterized
primarily as a quality issue but, in the future, pay for performance is really
going to be more of a cost issue. It will be aligned with these consumerdriven health plans. [T]he question is, who is going to do this sort of
management? [C]onsumers are not sensitix e to quality information at the
present time. [W]e can talk all we want about consumer-driven health plans
and pay for performance, but information from Harris Interactive [reports]
the number of people who have actually considered changing their health
care based on ratings of individual organizations and it is very small. It is
something that Tom Lee published in the New England Journal in 2005.
On the other hand, people will forego treatment if it costs them out of
pocket. This [slide shows] the number of people who are foregoing
treatment because they are in a low deductible plan as opposed to a high
deductible plan.6 So. the consumer-driven part of this will work on the cost
side; but, I am not sure if it will work on the quality side.
Then, finally, the last point I would like to make is, if it is going to work
on the quality side of pay for performance, who is going to do it? Who are
the managers in health care? [Is it] the doctors who will actually step
forward on the pay for performance? Most of it is supposed to be the
primary care doctors but, as you can see, and this is something I am very
concerned about as a former chair of the American Board of Internal
Medicine, we are losing our base of general internists and general
practitioners.
Family medicine, pediatrics, and internal medicine, or
general medicine, are fading. [T]here are few.er primary care residents and
there are fewer family medicine residents and, generally, internal medicine
residents. [W]hat this [slide] shows is how much specialists make as

6.
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opposed to ho\\ much primary care doctors make.' You can see significant
increases for the specialist, and they are making about double what the
primary care doctor does. [A]ll the talk about pay for performance welded
into some sort of consumer-driven health plan rhetoric is helpful, but there
is nobody there who is going to effect those sorts of changes.
We have a health care system that is primarily a problem with cost, but
what we are relying on is undennsurance or probably uninsurance to deal
with those cost issues. [W]e are expecting individual patients, sick people,
to be able to manage that, and we are not expecting anybody else, such as
the insurance company, the government, or the physicians, or the hospitals,
to manage that. [W]hat xxe are doing is creating a situation in which we are
going to have unalloyed increase in cost for the smaller and smaller group
of people who are going to be able to pay for it. [Mean]while, the
population ages and more and more people go into a Medicare system
which is impoverishing.
I cannot make out a good situation here. I cannot make out a good
situation for 2015. 1 think e~er-thing sort of points in the wrong direction.
I think it is relatively irresponsible for us from a policy point of view.
Having said that, let's see what the laxx can do about it.
Switching over now, to talk a little bit about some cases and a little bit
about health law. Can health law help out? Is there a threat to federal
enforcement? Do private litigators in some way effect change which is
going to be helpful? I think that antitrust is mostly a cost containment
issue. If you look at the sort of legal issues, now, these are what any of us
would teach when we teach a health law class. Most of it is going to be
right here; it is going to be antitrust law, non-profit law, fraud and abuse,
torts and contracts, and technology regulation. If you thought about what
they were aimed at in terms of quality, cost, and access, this is how I would
say that they line up: antitrust and cost containment; non-profit law and
access and quality; fraud and abuse and cost containment; and the like.
These are the problems that I have identified in that race through health
policy: demographic driven changes in health care; big time cost increases;
crippled managed care; a lack of technology control; a hospital financial
situation which is going to deteriorate, [and] quality is going to suffer;
access being reduced by underinsurance; and over-promised hope for pay
for performance. [W]here in the law-antitrust law, fraud and abuse, torts
and contracts, and non-profit law-would we expect these issues to be
addressed? [Y]ou would at least hope that the impulse of various areas of
health law would be able to help address some of these problems as [one]
disaggregates the problems of this headed-for-a-train-wreck health care
7.
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system: but, let's see what they actually do.
[A]ntitrust law, from my point of view, is looking pretty settled over the
last 15 years. Not much going on with the hospital side. The last case was
the ACA case in 1985 on the hospital side. [There has been] pretty strong
activity against the doctors since Arizona v. Maricopa County [457 U.S.
332 (1982)]. It is pretty clear that we are not going to be very active on the
hospital side in terms of enforcing lack of concentration in hospital markets.
[W]e have to note that there is a lot of FTC rhetoric, but I do not see a lot
of FTC action. [T]hat big report came out last summer from the FTC about
what they were planning to do, but so far I am sort of looking for the next
steps and not finding them.
[I]n the meantime, you do have to say that there are a lot of providers
who have become clear that they can get aggressive as the dominant
hospitals are demanding higher and higher premiums in their pricing.
[N]ow things have been [turned] on their head a little bit. Really two things
are of interest. One, [is] this Evanston Northwestern business that you all
know much more about than I do. [T]hey back into our health policy
position. Suddenly, everything is turned on its head by Med South and
Evanston Northwestern.
The Med South [case] is perhaps the more interesting one [In re Med
South, Inc. (2002)]. The doctors are such active players in the policy area.
What do I want to do as a doctor? What I want to do as a doctor [is] exert
market influence. [I want] to not be charged by the antitrust laws, but get
the insurance company to pay me more. That is what I want to do. I could
come up with some socially progressive reasons on that, but that is basically
how I keep a job.
The interesting thing about Med South is that it was a decision [that] was
a ghost IPA in a PPO world. When the whole world goes to PPO, you are
no longer managing care and the whole network falls apart. We are going
to contract together, but we are going to contract together and we are going
to do clinical integration. We are going to set up electronic medical
records, we are going to have guidelines, we are going to provide better
medical care. Do we let them act as a cartel and hope that we get the
benefits of health care behind that? Will the rates be outweighed by the
cost savings?
Here I have to sort of dip into the legal literature a little bit. I find this
sort of a charming little backwater here. [T]his [data] is from the Annals of
Health Law and it is an article that was written by a student of mine at
Harvard [Andrew S. Oldham]. 8 [W]hat he tried to do was to make an
8. Andrew S. Oldham, The MedSouth Joint - (Ad)venture The Antitrust Implications of
Virtual Health Care Networks, 14 ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 125, 168-170 (2005).
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argument using Oliver Williamson's antitrust theory. He was trying to look
at what Med South did. This is the average cost at time A, and time B, at
time 0, and time 1. [T]his is the quantity of services that were provided at
time 0 and time 1, and this was the pricing at time 0 and time 1. [H]e
follow[s] these relatively straightforward theories. He defines this as the
benefits and this as the cost associated with it and then, you have got to love
sort of the law and economics approach, he goes through a couple of
formulas on the next two pages. [H]ere is a nice formula that he puts
together, which I know you will want to study in depth. 9 It is in the 2005
Annals of Health Law.
[H]e goes through the whole demand curve with constant elasticity. If
the doctors get 20% increase in cost - in the price they are being paid, that
is okay as long as they develop a .02400 decrease in the overall. It works in
this formula, but then when I got him to sort of apply it to the real world
and try to find what overall costs were, that was where the problem [came]
from. What are we actually talking about in terms of the cost of care for a
group of patients, especially in a non-managed world? I am not sure
antitrust enforcers are ever going to really figure out what this formula
should look like. I think that the individual doctors and individual doctor
groups will figure out how to profit from it. As a result, I do not see how
antitrust changes the antitrust laws along the lines of Med South can really
reduce the cost of law.
If you combine that with the California Dental Association case, a real
backing away from the Goldfarb and the National Society of Professional
Engineers, which was hostile towards professionals, instead we have seen
the Supreme Court showing greater deference to professionals. All of that is
going to lead to doctors who are going to put together ways to collaborate
together to get higher pricing from the insurance companies but not, I do
not think, an improvement on quality.
[O]n the other side of it, on the hospital side of it, what we see is the
Evanston Northwestern case. I was stunned by this. You all know about it
[but] I do not. From my point of view, it looks like a relatively narrow little
market area that they are defining as the market and the analysis of the
market share in this case. [The opinion] is 200 pages. I did read through it
and I still could not find a good way to fit it with previous thinking about
hospital markets. [T]his suggests a much more stringent approach than
what we had seen in the past. I would submit to you that if there is a
reasonable place to put responsibility in the health care system, I think you
are better relying on the hospitals than the doctor. [This case] is interesting
in that it is hostile towards merging hospitals in the same way that Med
9.
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South is kind of coddling merging doctors and I do not think that is a good
way to do it. I cannot make hide nor hair of it. It does not seem to be
moving in the right direction, though.
There has not been much since Ocean State and Marshfield Clinic. This
is going to be a critical issue going forward: how the provider-insurer
relationship plays in the antitrust; but we don't have enough time to go into
that.
I want to just talk about non-profit law because I think that is the other
major area we can look at. Will non-profit law act in a way in which we
can bring about a better health care system? The impulse of non-profit law
conflicts with the pro-competition rhetoric of the FTC. It is much more of
a regulatory approach. It is a peculiar mix of aggressive attorney generals
and, sometimes, federal policy. So let's look at some of the recent
dex elopments of non-profit law to see how it's affecting things.
[T]he latest challenge is the so-called Scruggs litigation, [named] after
the lax yer Richard Scruggs, who is a famous class action lawyer in
Nlississippi and who initiated this. [T]here are large groups of plaintiffs'
attorneys who come together to work on these kinds of issues. [T]he
problem with the Scruggs litigation is that they had a real problem with
standing and it's not surprising. Jim Blunking, who is a law professor down
at Vanderbilt, identified this as an issue 30 years ago in the Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, a case the Supreme Court decided.
[The plaintiffs' attorneys in the Scruggs litigation] have been turned away
in terms of standing and are seeking to penetrate the state court.
What are they doing in the Scruggs litigation? Well, they wanted
standing to certify the class, which they did not get. They wanted to be a
third-party beneficiary of the contract created by the tax exempt status.
They analogized themselves to the Hill Burton litigation. Then they saw a
breach of EMTALA, which is always a stretch, especially the way
EMTALA's been constructed over the last eight or ten years. [T]hen finally
they are trying to use acceptance of 501(3)(c) as creating a charitable trust.
Courts have rejected each of these grounds. [What is] the impulse here?
Try to get the hospitals to be more open toward taking care of patients who
are underinsured or lacking in insurance, try to get them to act as real nonprofit organizations.
[T]he Kolar v. New York Presbyterian case is typical in that plaintiffs
have lost their way. They need to consult a map, or compass, or [the]
Constitution, because plaintiffs have come to the judicial branch for relief
that may only be granted by the legislative branch. That is the bottom line
in regard to the federal government's approach. [T]he federal government
does not really want anything to do with this. Instead it is going to be
[turned] over to the States.
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol15/iss2/10
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Turning over to the states in the non-profit area, there has been some
very interesting activity by the Attorney General Elliot Spitzer, who is so
very active, brought litigation. This is the Manhattan Eve, Ear, and Throat
Hospital litigation. [W]hat Spitzer did in that case was that he forced them
to reconsider a plan which they were going to, basically, sell their plant and
then set up a series of ambulatory centers throughout the metropolitan area.
[Spitzer] said no, that was not going to support the health care system. [H]e
was successful in that litigation.
In the Littauer litigation, two hospitals merged, a Jewish hospital and a
Catholic hospital. [I]n the merge, the family planning services went away.
Spitzer thought that that was bad, so he tried to break up that merger again
based on his authority as the Attorney General overseeing non-profit
institutions. Spitzer [was] trxing to make policy, but he ended up losing in
the Littauer case.
If this is NN
hat we are going to depend on, individual attorney generals
who are always running for governor - that's what they do; they run for
governor - trying to make policy through enforcement of the non-profit
law, I am not sure that %orks.
In Re Allina, this was a really interesting case. You can get on the
Minnesota Attorney General's website and it will take you to the evidence
that they put together around Allina. [l]t makes great reading because they
examined what Allina was spending money on. They found that they were
buying golf memberships and that the people were traveling to all of these
places having room service and breakfast. It was very expensive and they
detailed all the spending there. This was right after the AHERP collapse in
Pennsylvania. [T]he Attorney General wanted to step in but the result was
that they forced Allina to spin-off the HMO. It does not make much sense.
In many ways, it could be considered rational, [having] the HMO there in
with the health care system leads to some sort of integration. [Y]ou have to
ask yourself, is the Attorneys General's Office really the place where you
want policy being made?
Fraud and abuse is a very active place for health lawyers; but, from my
point of view as a health care executive, I have to spend a lot on attorneys,
but it does not have to do with anything I want that looks like it is going to
be profitable.
There has been muted success, if we look through the Greber and
Hanlester cases up through McClatchey, but the major metaphor is, "Tell
me how I can get this done."The other thing I have to say about fraud and
abuse is that it does inhibit collaboration between hospitals and doctors.
Our business as hospitals is to try to get business in the door; get patients in
the door. Fraud and abuse says you cannot do that in a way that other
businesses certainly can. [I]nsofar as it creates a sort of wall between
Published by LAW eCommons, 2006

11

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 15 [2006], Iss. 2, Art. 10
Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 15

collaboration, I think it cannot be good. I really believe that gainsharing
makes good sense from an efficiency point of view.
In terms of torts and contracts, I feel that [area] is a place where we are
not spending money well. I do want to make one more point. [I]f you look
at ERISA litigation and what it did to managed care, it was striking in terms
of its elimination of managed care, but it is emblematic of what is going on
in the Supreme Court. Go to the Supreme Court and ask, "What sort of
advice are you getting about health law?" [A]ll we know is Travelers
reduces the scope it relates to. Pegram, coming out of Illinois, endorses
this sort of notion of eligibility and mixed decision-making - quality as
opposed to eligibility - and really opens up things from an ERISA point of
view. [T]hen, [in] Rush Prudential, [the Court] expand[s] the savings
clause. It looks like the Supreme Court has completely gone on its head
from where they were surrounding ERISA in the early 1990s to really allow
more litigation.
So everything gets turned on its head by Aetna v. Davila, which is the
Texas Health Care Liability Act litigation. A unanimous Supreme Court
said that ERISA is broad. [Aetna] closes the Pegram loophole around
mixed decisions and really limits the savings clause as it was used in Rush
Prudential. [I]t looks like the Supreme Court is saying, "We don't know
where to go with this. This is not our decision to make. We thought maybe
we were causing problems with health policy when we had ERISA
preempted with fraud. So we narrowed it. [N]ow we narrowed it too far
and we're going to open it back up." You cannot look to [the Court] for
guidance in this area.
I think that an even better statement is the case of PhRMA v. Walsh,
which had to do with a Medicaid drug coverage. [T]his [case] was about a
very complex issue of state-negotiated rebates for non-Medicaid patients.
The circuit court reversed the granted injunction that PhRMA had managed
to get in this program and the Supreme Court affirmed. Maine was
regulating out-of-state transactions. [I]f you look at the decision, the judges
had a great variety of views of the Medicaid purpose, even on the fact
surrounding Medicaid. The striking thing is [that the justices] came
together to say, "It's too complicated. DHHS has to decide. The courts
should not be involved here."
If I had to summanize, we see a health care system that is not doing well.
[E]verything you can predict about it says it is going to do worse in terms of
good quality, lower cost, and greater access during the course of the next
ten years. [L]ooking over both state and federal litigation, in particular
federal litigation, you do not get any sense that the judges have any purpose
on these issues, whatsoever. In fact, the high court is really saying, we
should not be involved in this. This is a policy issue for the policymakers.
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol15/iss2/10
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I have to summarize by saying that it is a relatively ugly diagnosis for the
health care system looking forward, but I do not see that there is much hope
for therapy out of the private litigation. We are going to have to have
policy analysts and policymakers come together to set up a more rational
form than we would get out of the system of litigation.
Thank you very much.
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